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	<title>InfoSecMinds &#187; CIA Triad</title>
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		<title>Assessing C-I-A values.</title>
		<link>http://infosecminds.com/2009/12/23/assessing-c-i-a-values/</link>
		<comments>http://infosecminds.com/2009/12/23/assessing-c-i-a-values/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Dec 2009 09:31:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vinod Puthuseeri</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CIA Triad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security Risk Assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security Risk Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asset values]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[C-I-A]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://infosecminds.com/?p=195</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[It is a common discussion during an information security risk assessment exercise at most of the organizations. As a general practice the asset value is derived by weighing the confidentiality ©, Integrity (I) and availability (A) value of an asset. While the assets are categorized into Information, Hardware, Software, Service and People, my argument always [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">It is a common discussion during an information security risk assessment exercise at most of the organizations. As a general practice the asset value is derived by weighing the confidentiality ©, Integrity (I) and availability (A) value of an asset. While the assets are categorized into Information, Hardware, Software, Service and People, my argument always has been to say that C-I-A values can be assessed for Information Assets only and for all other it should just be the availability value.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span id="more-195"></span>Now, let’s look at what is the definition of information assets. Information assets are basically data that is in transit or at rest and also that are available on papers. Having this in mind, I think it is easier to assess the C-I-A values of these assets. Let us take an example:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Contract documents is an information asset or let’s take the file server in an organization, the “data” in the file server is an information asset. How much impact the organization would have, if the information in the document is exposed to unauthorized persons..? – if the impact is less, confidentiality value is less and if the impact is high, confidentiality value is high. Similarly, this is applicable for Integrity and Availability. If the impact is high by losing the integrity or availability, it will be rated high or else low. After determining the C-I-A values the asset value is derived by either taking the highest value or with some simple calculations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Let’s consider the C-I-A values for a hardware asset. The confidentiality value of the hardware asset is derived by the information that it holds and hence I feel that there would be duplication if we consider the confidentiality value here. We are considering the hardware asset as a whole and hence integrity of the server is not applicable here. Availability value is what we need to consider for an hardware asset.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As we have looked into the hardware asset, the same applies to software and service assets. Now let us look at the people asset.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">If we are trying to consider the C-I-A values of a person, let’s say the CEO of the organization, yes he has confidential information. But how do we assess the confidentiality value? It is hard to determine the information that he is holding in his memory and it might also be varying constantly. Which means you cannot determine the “C” either as high or low at given point in time. I am not quite sure about the integrity aspect and coming down to the availability value; this definitely needs to be assessed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Again, the availability value of people asset according to me should always be set to high, irrespective of his designation, age, gender etc. Why?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Controls are implemented based on the derived risk value. Risk value is proportionate to the asset value, which means if the asset value increases, so does the risk value. In this context, let us take an example:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Contract document (Information Asset) C-I-A = 5 * Threat = 3 * Probability = 3 = 45 (Risk Value)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">IT Manager (People Asset) A = 3 * Threat = 3 * Probability = 1 = 9 (Risk Value)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the above scenario, the information asset has a risk value higher that the people asset. If there is a fire break out in the organization, which of these assets will be well protected or rescued? People will always be considered first during a disaster and hence the asset value of people should always be rated as high. In this case you may ask, we already know that people is first, then why should be even consider listing people asset in the risk assessment exercise? Well, Your thoughts</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">I would even look to see why we need to consider hardware, software and service assets for the assessment, because all the values are anyway dependent on the information it holds or transmits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Your thoughts again.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Parkerian Hexad</title>
		<link>http://infosecminds.com/2009/08/16/149/</link>
		<comments>http://infosecminds.com/2009/08/16/149/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2009 11:36:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vinod Puthuseeri</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CIA Triad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security Risk Assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security Risk Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISMS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISO 27001:2005]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Assessment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIA]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://infosecminds.com/?p=149</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Parkerian hexad is a set of six elements of information security proposed by Donn B. Parker, renowned security consultant and writer. The term was coined by M. E. Kabay. The Parkerian hexad adds three additional attributes to the three classic security attributes of the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability). The Parkerian Hexad attributes are [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">The Parkerian hexad is a set of six elements of information security proposed by Donn B. Parker, renowned security consultant and writer. The term was coined by M. E. Kabay. The Parkerian hexad adds three additional attributes to the three classic security attributes of the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability).</p>
<p>The Parkerian Hexad attributes are the following:</p>
<ul>
<li>Confidentiality</li>
<li><strong>Possession or Control</strong></li>
<li>Integrity</li>
<li><strong>Authenticity</strong></li>
<li>Availability</li>
<li><strong>Utility</strong></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These attributes of information are atomic in that they are not broken down into further constituents; they are non-overlapping in that they refer to unique aspects of information. Any information security breach can be described as affecting one or more of these fundamental attributes of information.</p>
<p>I think I don’t require to provide the explanation of C-I-A here. Let’s look at the other attributes.</p>
<p><span id="more-149"></span></p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Possession or Control</span></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Suppose a thief were to steal a sealed envelope containing a bank debit card and (foolishly) its personal identification number. Even if the thief did not open that envelope, the victim of the theft would legitimately be concerned that (s)he could do so at any time without the control of the owner. That situation illustrates a loss of control or possession of information but does not involve the breach of confidentiality.</p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Authenticity</span></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Authenticity refers to correct labeling or attribution of information. For example, if a criminal forges e-mail headers to make it look as if an innocent person is sending threatening e-mail messages, there has been no breach of confidentiality (the thief uses his or her own e-mail account), possession (no information has been taken out of the control of the victim), or integrity (the e-mail messages are exactly as intended by the criminal).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">What is breached is authenticity: the e-mail is incorrectly attributed to someone else. Similarly, misusing a field in a database to store information that is incorrectly labeled is a breach of authenticity; e.g., storing a merchant&#8217;s tax code in a field labeled as the merchant&#8217;s ZIP code would violate the authenticity of the information.</p>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Utility</span></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Utility means usefulness. For example, suppose someone encrypted data on disk to prevent unauthorized access or undetected modifications – and then lost the decryption key: that would be a breach of utility. The data would be confidential, controlled, integral, authentic, and available – they just wouldn’t be useful in that form.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Similarly, conversion of salary data from one currency into an inappropriate currency would be a breach of utility, as would the storage of data in a format inappropriate for a specific computer architecture; e.g., EBCDIC instead of ASCII or 9-track magnetic tape instead of DVD-ROM. A tabular representation of data substituted for a graph could be described as a breach of utility if the substitution made it more difficult to interpret the data. Utility is often confused with availability because breaches such as those described in these examples may also require time to work around the change in data format or presentation. However, the concept of usefulness is distinct from that of availability.</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Source: www.wikipedia.org</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Having said this, I would like to discuss the possible controls that can be implemented to mitigate risks for the above 3 attributes.</p>
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